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A commentary on Professor Edwin P. McManus' paper, "The
Natural Law and the Fifth Amendment," which appeared in the January 1957 issue of THE CATHOLIC LAWYER.

MORALITY AND THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT
JOHN

I

HAVE

BEEN

ASKED*

R.

CONNERY,

S.J.t

to discuss Professor McManus' paper on The

Natural Law and The Fifth Amendment delivered at the Natural Law
Conference of'the Guild of Catholic Lawyers.' Before beginning the
discussion I would like to remark that it is particularly gratifying to see
a member of the legal profession interested in the moral aspects of this
problem. My past experience has been that the natural law has been to
a large extent overlooked by the legal profession in discussing modern
problems relating to the Fifth Amendment. Professor McManus deserves
credit for pioneering in what is not only a neglected but also a very
difficult area of this whole subject.
In the discussion I am quite satisfied to accept the limitations which
Professor McManus wisely puts upon the matter. Both of us are concerned only with the problem of the Fifth Amendment in relation to
congressional investigations of communism. Neither of us would want
to do away with the Fifth Amendment, and we both admit that it is
available for use by witnesses in congressional investigations, although
Professor McManus is not altogether satisfied with this extensive interpretation of the Amendment.
I would like to center my own remarks around what I consider the
three major questions which Professor McManus has brought up in
connection with these appeals: 1) the morality of attaching a stigma to
a person who makes an appeal to the Fifth Amendment; 2) the morality
of an appeal by one who is not presently a Communist; 3) the morality
of an appeal by a Communist. In using the term morality I extend the
discussion into the realm of the natural law.
t Litt. B., Xavier University; M.A., Loyola University of Chicago; S.T.D., Gregorian
University; Professor of Moral Theology, West Baden College.
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Is it morally permissible to attach a
stigma to' a person who appeals to the Fifth
Amendment? It is not clear to me from a
careful reading of Professor McManus'
paper that he would give a blunt affirmative
answer to this question, but it is my impression that he would not be completely unsympathetic to such an answer. It should
be profitable to discuss the question if only
to clarify the issues at stake.
To illustrate his case, Professor McManus
pictures an investigation scene in which a
witness is confronted with the question:
"Are you, right this minute, a Communist?"
To clarify the position of the witness he
then appeals to an opinion of Chief Justice
Marshall in the Aaron Burr case in which
the Chief Justice maintained that if the
declaration that a statement would be incriminating be untrue the one making it
would be guilty of perjury.2 It would follow, then, that if the witness appealed to
the Fifth Amendment, the answer to the
above question would be in his case incriminating or else he would be guilty of
perjury. In either case it seems that he
would be liable to a legitimate stigma.
Before considering the actual case in
question it might be advisable to point out
in general that to admit that a statement
would be incriminating is not to admit
crime. The most innocent person may at
times be caught in incriminating circumstances. It is not uncommon either for criminals to frame innocent people by planting
evidence. To illustrate the distinction between incrimination and crime, moralists
cite the example of a question concerning
ownership of a gun with which a crime was
committed. If the person interrogated actu-
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ally owned the gun, a straight answer would
be incriminating even though another had
committed the crime. They also present the
case of a person accused of homicide in a
situation where the other party had been
killed in legitimate self-defense. If the defendant were asked whether he killed the
man, a direct answer would be incriminating even though he was guilty of no crime.
One who would jump to a conclusion 'of
guilt in either of these two cases would be
guilty of rash judgment. Serious injustice,
then, might be done by stigmatizing a person who appealed to the Fifth Amendment
to avoid an incriminating answer.
While admitting this conclusion in general one might argue that although an appeal to the Fifth Amendment in the above
two cases would not be an implicit admission of crime, it would be at least an implicit admission of ownership of the gun
and of killing a man. When one who is
asked directly whether he is a Communist
invokes the privilege, is there not implicit
in this appeal an admission of Communist
affiliation? If so, then one may legitimately
attach a stigma to such an appeal.
It is not my purpose to discuss the implications of an appeal in the two cases
given above. When one is acquainted with
all the antecedents of an admission that a
statement might be incriminating, it is easy
to say what is implicit in it. It is obviously
not as easy to work backwards from the
admission itself to its exact implications.
And in regard to the actual case under discussion Dean Griswold cites a Supreme
Court decision which makes it even more
difficult to draw any inferences from an
appeal to the Fifth Amendment. 3 The deciGriswold, The Fifth Amendment
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sion in the Rogers case would make it
very risky to infer present membership in
the Communist party from such an appeal.
In that decision it was ruled that an individual who had answered the first questions
put to her regarding Communist affiliation
ipso facto waived her right to an appeal in
subsequent questioning in that field. Even
though one were not now a Communist,
then, if he had any reason to believe that
subsequent questioning would be incriminating, to protect himself legally he would
have to invoke the privilege right from the
initial question. To admit that an answer
in the present case might be incriminating
in this sense would not be an admission of
present Communist affiliation. It does not,
therefore, deserve a stigma.
In a later section of his talk Professor
McManus passes from abstract considerations to the concrete situation. The fact is
that people do attach a stigma to an appeal
to the Fifth Amendment. The unsophisticated employer, unacquainted with all the
legal nuances of such an appeal, readily
concludes that if his employee were not a
Communist he would not have invoked the
privilege; he subsequently discharges him.
Is he guilty of doing wrong? Professor
McManus feels that proof of innocence in
this case devolves upon the employee.
In view of what has already been said,
I think one would have to admit that the
employer would be making a rash judgment
in jumping to the above conclusion and dismissing his employee on the score that he
is a Communist. I do not say that he is
culpable in making this judgment. It is his
ignorance of the law rather than any ill
will that is responsible for the judgment.
It would certainly be to the advantage of
the employee to advise him regarding the
nature and implications of an appeal to the

Fifth -Amendment but I do not think it
calls for a positive proof of his innocence.
I would be perfectly willing to admit that
an employer, examining into the reasons
why an employee was called before the
committee to testify, might have ample
reason for being suspicious and even for
discharging him. I would admit also that
employers, at least in certain fields, could
legitimately demand that their employees
cooperate with investigating committees.
In this event, however, an employee should
be advised beforehand as to what is expected of him. Since cooperating with an
investigating committee goes beyond the
call of what an employee would ordinarily
consider his duty to the company, it should
be clear to him beforehand that it is expected of him. It does not seem quite fair
to penalize a man for taking advantage of
a right unless a company makes it clear he
is expected to forego this right.
It is quite true, also, that the general
public might presume, from an appeal to
the Fifth Amendment, a Communist affiliation. This would implicate the employer
who kept such a person in his employ and
might result in loss of business. No employer would be obliged to renew a contract
with an employee under such circumstances. It might be an act of charity to do
so, but certainly not obligatory. The employee may be a victim of a rash judgment
on the part of the general public but the
employer is not in any way obliged to
absorb the damages resulting from such a
judgment.
Although in a given case, therefore,
there may be many reasons for discharging
an employee who appeals to the Fifth
Amendment, it cannot be on the basis of
present Communist affiliation. Such affiliation is not implicit in ihis appeal. The fact
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that a stigma does attach to a person invoking the privilege highlights in my opinion
the fact that the legislation as it stands
does not provide adequate protection to a
witness in a congressional investigation.
The defendant in a criminal case is in a far
better position; he can simply plead not
guilty to the crime of which he is accused
and no one will be tempted to draw any
inference from such a plea. The congressional witness is not free to make this plea;
his only protection is recourse to the Fifth
Amendment with all the risks attached to
an admission of incrimination. In this situation the natural law would allow the use of
evasive answers or mental reservations as
protective measures but according to the
civil law these measures leave the witness
open to a charge of legal perjury, or contempt. If the witness wants protection, he
must admit incrimination.
We can now take up the second question
at issue: What is the morality of an appeal
to the Fifth Amendment by one who is not
presently a Communist. While Professor
McManus does not commit himself definitely on this question, he does intimate
that such an appeal would not be reasonable and therefore could hardly be justified
either from a legal or a moral standpoint.
Certainly, if a person is not a Communist,
a statement to that effect would not directly
incriminate him. At first sight there seems
to be no assignable reason why he should
not admit that he is not a Communist. Yet
the decision in the Rogers case already
mentioned makes a straight answer to an
* inquiry concerning present Communist affiliation dangerous for a person who is not
now a Communist but was so formerly, or
at least belonged to organizations which
have been labeled subversive. If this decision can be taken as a norm, a straight
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answer to this question would leave him
without benefit of appeal in any further
questioning in this field. Though it would
not directly incriminate him, therefore, an
unequivocal' answer would be indirectly
incriminating in the sense that it would
carry with it an implicit waiver of future
appeal. In future questioning he would be
faced with the dilemma of giving incriminating answers or of being charged with
perjury or contempt.
Professor McManus points out that no
one in similar circumstances has ever suffered legally from cooperating with an investigating committee; there have been no
indictments, no prosecutions, no convictions. To my knowledge this is perfectly
true. But apart from a case where immunity
is granted there are no juridical guarantees
against legal action; and without such guarantees the experience of the past gives very
limited assurance. Moreover, even when
immunity from prosecution is granted, as
Robert F. Drinan, S.J., points out, it is not
a complete guarantee even from a legal
standpoint. A witness may be liable to a
"charge of perjury or any other accusation
not derived, in the government's opinion,
from the coerced testimony but in fact the
4
remote fruit of this compelled disclosure."
Moreover, legal penalties are not the
sole concern of a witness. To illustrate, let
us suppose that a husband has committed
a sin of adultery. It is a sin of the past and
he is truly repentant for it. We can suppose
there is no danger of any kind of prosecution if he reveals it publicly. Can we say
that he is unreasonable in being reluctant
to do so? The witness before a congressional committee is faced with a similar
kind of self-defamation in publicly admit' Drinan, The Right to Silence, 95 AMERICA 106,
107 (1956).
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ting past Communist affiliation. Apart from
the embarrassment which such confession
would mean, there are also, as in the case
of adultery, the unpredictable civil penalties not covered in any way by immunity
from criminal prosecution. As Father
Drinan points out: "Once a person in our
society has confessed that he was or is a
Communist, life can never be quite the same
5
for him."
In dealing with this question Professor
McManus put the emphasis on the legal
security of the witness. I do not feel that
he has made sufficient allowance for the
more social hazards that accompany the
testimony of witnesses. In a concrete situation, with a view to the stigma that is likely
to attach to an appeal to the Fifth Amendment, I think I would advise a witness to
take a chance on a candid admission of
past affiliation, but the hazards attached
to such an admission would prevent me
from imposing any obligation. Actually, I
am inclined to agree with Father Drinan
that the Compulsory Testimony Act, in
spite of the legal immunity it grants, raises
6
certain moral problems.
We can consider now the obligation of
the actual Communist before a congressional
committee. Professor McManus grants that
according to the civil law he has an absolute right to invoke the Fifth Amendment.
But the natural law allows this witness only
a limited right of self-defense. Where the
good of the community is at stake Professor McManus maintains that the natural
law demands the individual sacrifice his
own convenience and admit guilt in spite
of the personal consequences.
It is quite true that the common good
Ibid.

Ibid.

is superior to the good of the individual.
It follows logically that the good of the
individual must at times be sacrificed to
protect the community. If, for example, I
know that someone is plotting against the
community and there is no other way of
averting harm from the community, I would
be bound to reveal the culprit even though
it might mean the death penalty for him.
I might be bound to report him to the
proper authorities even if it meant serious
harm to myself. Granted that revelation is
the only way to avert the harm from the
community, I would have the obligation
to reveal the responsible party whatever
the consequences to the individual.
But there is an important distinction to
be made between the obligation to reveal
the crime of another and the obligation to
reveal one's own criminal intent. Since one
does not have control over the will of
another, reporting crime may be the only
way to prevent it. This can hardly be true
when the danger to the community comes
from personal criminal intentions. Except
in the rare case where the individual has
no control over his own impulses, it would
be difficult to see how self-accusation before the public authorities would be the
only means of protecting the community.
There is always the alternative of foregoing
his criminal intentions. If he failed to do
so, it is here that he would be at fault
rather than in failure to accuse himself
before the public authorities. The obligation of the Communist before the community, then, is to abandon his subversive
activities rather than reveal them; and his
sin is his failure to abandon these activities
rather than his appeal to the Fifth Amendment.
Certainly, if a witness is questioned regarding the activities of another, he would
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ordinarily be obliged to cooperate by the
natural as well as the positive law. And this
obligation would prevail even at the cost of
serious personal loss if a greater good of

the community were at stake.
Before concluding the discussion I would
like to comment on one other point in Professor McManus' paper. He speaks of the
right to silence on the part of a witness as
the exception rather than the rule if considered from the standpoint of the natural
law. This is quite true of a witness in a
criminal case, or even in a civil case. But
the term witness is used in' a very broad

sense in connection with congressional investigations. As I have already mentioned
elsewhere in dealing with this subject, a
person called before the committee, besides
playing the role of witness, finds himself at
times in the role of a defendant, ht times in
the role of one expected to report unknown
crimes.7 Certainly, when he is playing the
role of a witness in the strict sense, that is,
testifying to actions of others against whom
a charge has been made, the right to silence
will be the exception rather than the rule.
But when questioned about crimes committed by himself, or at least about incriminating circumstances, the right to silence
is the rule rather than the exception.
In earlier times, when civil legislation
demanded a confession from a defendant
if the court was in possession of a partial
proof of the crime, moralists held that the
'Connery,

The Right To Silence, 39 MARQ. L.

REV. 180, 181 (1956).
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moral law would not bind a defendant to
confess when his own 'life or an equivalent
loss were at stake. This was by way of
exception; but the exception was to the current civil law, not to the natural law as
such. If one were limited to the natural law
apart from any determination by the civil
law, I do not think one could prove an
obligation to confess personal crime; otherwise, I find it hard to explain the axiom:
nemo tenetur tradere seipsum (no one is
obliged to betray himself). This is one of
those areas in which civil law must determine the obligation. It is my own personal
opinion, moreover, that a law which does
not impose an obligation to confess is more
in accord with the natural law than one
which would impose such an obligation. As
far as the natural law is concerned, moralists have had trouble even establishing
the liceity of self-defamation. 8 If there is
any obligation to confess under present
legislation, then, it is the exception rather
than the rule.
In conclusion, let me say that I share
Professor McManus' fear of communism.
Anyone who knows communism must fear
it. I would regret very much, too, if this
discussion of his very excellent talk were in
any way to lessen his zeal in pursuing communism and Communists. My only hope is
that it will serve to make the fight against
communism more effective by clarifying
somewhat the principles upon which it
a
must rest.
sCf. LUGO, DE IURE ET IUSTITIA, disp. 14, §10.

